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Abstract 
Three different technologies were considered in the technology development 
phase of the Javelin anti-tank missile system: a laser-beam riding system, a fiber-
optic system, and a forward looking infrared system. The Army awarded three “Proof 
of Principle” contracts to three competing contractor teams to develop and conduct a 
“fly-off” technology competition. The current work analyzed the three alternatives 
using measures of effectiveness (MOE) to combine performance across nine 
acquisition objectives. These MOEs were compared with development and 
procurement cost estimates. No alternative dominated. Marginal benefits analysis 
was next used to define the trade–off space among the alternatives. Differences in 
the likelihood of successful development of the alternatives were evaluated, resulting 
in one technology appearing to dominate. However, the acquisition approach 
created a real option for the best alternative that could differentially add value to the 
alternatives. A real options model was used to analyze the value provided by 
investing in this competitive option. Results indicate the Army paid less than the total 
value of the three options, but could have increased net savings by paying different 
amounts to test each alternative. The analysis method provides a logical and 
defendable approach to the analysis of alternatives during technology development 
uncertainty. 
Keywords: Real Options, Analysis of Alternatives, Technology Development, 
Javelin 
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Real Options in Military System Acquisition: 
The Case Study of Technology Development 
for the Javelin Anti-Tank Weapon System 
Introduction 
Anti-tank weapons have been important to meeting Department of Defense 
objectives since the appearance of armored vehicles on the modern battlefield in 
World War 1. From the 1960s through 1970s, the M67 90mm recoilless rifle was 
used as a primary mounted and dismounted infantry weapon against tanks and 
armored personnel carriers. This weapon was replaced by the DRAGON anti-tank 
weapon system, introduced in the late 1970s, which had a wired command link that 
was employed to guide the missile to a target that was optically tracked by the 
gunner. The DRAGON system had been developed in the 1960s as a response to 
the Soviet development of the AT-3 SAGGER manpack missile system, carried in a 
fiberglass container about the size of a small suitcase. But the DRAGON system had 
reliability problems and limited range and lethality, and it was difficult for gunners to 
aim the missile and track the target. The goal was to replace DRAGON with a 
weapon with increased range and lethality and less weight (a later requirement 
emerged for the ability to be launched from inside an enclosure; e.g., buildings and 
bunkers). The Advanced Anti-Armor Weapon System–Medium (AAWS–M) project 
inspired the Javelin program. The joint Army and Marine Corps operational 
requirements document for the Javelin was formally approved—amended in 1986–
88.  
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Figure 1. The Javelin Anti-tank Weapon System 
Missile and Command Launch Unit 
(Personal communication with US Army Infantry School, Jan, 1992) 
The Javelin is a “fire-and-forget” missile. This fire-and-forget capability came 
from the Joint Army/Marine Corps Source Selection Board’s decision to select the 
development team’s AAWS–M design, which coupled an imaging infra-red, forward-
looking infra-red radar IR (FLIR) system with a beyond state-of-the-art onboard 
software tracking system.  
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Figure 2. The Javelin Gunner Looks Through the Command Launch Unit  
(Lyons, Long, & Chait, 2006) 
Javelin required several immature technologies in order to successfully attain 
program requirements. A number of the subsystems were based on these immature 
technologies. For example, the munition required a tandem shaped charge to first 
set off an explosion to deflect reactive armor defensive systems and then a primary 
munition for armor penetration and target defeat. The target locating and missile 
guidance subsystems were particularly troublesome technical issues. Three very 
different technologies were initially considered in a technology development phase, 
in order to not constrain the materiel solution to the FLIR approach: a laser-beam 
riding system, a fiber-optic guided system, and the forward looking infrared system. 
Each of the three potential technologies generally offered the needed capabilities 
and represented acquisition options. Rather than choosing a single technology, in 
August 1986, the Army decided to award three Proof of Principle (technology 
demonstration phase) contracts of $30 million each to three competing contractor 
teams to develop the technologies and conduct a “fly-off” missile competition. The 
Army paid $90 million for these three options that all had potential but none with a 
guarantee of success. By doing this, the Army acquired the right, but not the 
obligation, to purchase the most successful technology for the Javelin missile. This 
comprises the essence of a “real option.” 
In this paper, we apply the real option model to the three candidate Javelin 
guidance technologies. We begin with a short introduction to real options theory 
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followed by a description of the Javelin guidance technology options. Next, we 
present a model for measuring the effectiveness of the three guidance technologies 
and examine the cost effectiveness of each alternative based on “cost per kill” under 
deterministic and probabilistic assumptions. Finally, we use a decision tree to model 
the value of each option, given the probability of success and the costs to recover 
from failure.  
Real Options  
Real options theory is one means of structuring and valuing flexible strategies 
to address uncertainty (Courtney, Kirkland, & Viguerie, 1997). An option is a right 
without an obligation to take specific future actions depending on how uncertain 
conditions evolve (Brealey & Meyers, 2000). Real options apply options theory to 
tangible assets. The central premise of real options theory is that, if future conditions 
are uncertain and changing the strategy later incurs substantial costs, then having 
flexible strategies and delaying decisions can have value when compared to making 
all strategic decisions during pre-project planning (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999). Real 
options theory helps answer questions such as the following: What are the future 
alternative actions? When should we choose between these actions to maximize 
value based on the evolution of conditions? and How much is the right to choose an 
alternative later worth at any given time?  
A real option compares one or more alternative strategies that may be used in 
the future to a reference strategy that is committed to in the present, if chosen. 
Conditions are monitored and potentially converted into a signal and compared to 
trigger conditions using an exercise decision rule to determine if the reference 
strategy should be abandoned and an alternative strategy adopted (i.e., to “exercise” 
the option). The waiting to see how uncertainty evolves (i.e., learning) and thereby 
make better strategy choices is an inherent part of real options. Therefore, delayed 
decision-making is an important feature of real options. In the classic example of 
stock purchase options, the exercise decision rule is to buy a stock if the price rises 
above a certain price, and the exercise signal is the stock price. The decision delay 
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is incurred while the option holder waits to see if the stock price rises above the 
exercise price. In real options, one must define both the exercise decision and the 
exercise signal in the context of a set of observable variables.   
Real options can be described along several dimensions, including 
ownership, the source of value, complexity, and degree to which the option is 
available. A common topology separates real options according to the type of 
managerial action applied, including options that postpone (hold and phasing 
options), change the amount of investment (growth, scaling, or abandonment 
options), or alter the form of involvement (switching options).  
The use of real options can focus on the monetary valuation of the flexibility 
or on the design and impacts of real options on decision-making in practice 
(managerial real options). Both of these aspects of real options can improve project 
management and add value to projects. A wide variety of mathematical models have 
been used to estimate the monetary value of options, which can be used to select 
among alternative strategies (e.g., Garvin & Cheah, 2004). These models use the 
various benefits and costs of an option to estimate its value. Although some real 
options can be purchased and exercised at no cost (e.g., the option to have salaried 
employees work overtime), real options become interesting when significant costs 
are required to obtain, maintain, or exercise the flexibility that may add value. The 
option cost is what must be paid for access to the flexibility to change the strategy. 
Option maintenance costs include benefits lost by delaying the strategy choice 
decision. Option exercise costs are the costs of changing the strategy if the option is 
exercised. One simple and intuitive approach is to estimate the value of an option as 
the difference between the values of the project with and without the option (e.g., by 
assuming uncertainty impacts future performance versus assuming a single specific 
and known future).  
In contrast to a focus on option valuation, a focus on managerial real options 
works to improve decision-making by structuring risky circumstances faced by 
practitioners into real options and facilitating option design and implementation. For 
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example, Ceylan and Ford (2002) describe the use of options to manage technology 
development risk in the development of the National Ignition Facility by the 
Department of Energy. Managerial real options address many of the challenges of 
using real options valuation models to improve risk management (Triantis, 2005; 
Garvin & Ford, 2012). Structuring development program risk management 
challenges as real options requires describing challenges with standard real options 
parameters and structures (Miller & Lessard, 2000). This can improve managerial 
understanding of the risk and prepare for risk management strategy design. Option 
design is improved by assessing and selecting individual and interacting sets of 
option parameters and their values, such as evaluating the exercise cost that would 
make an option very attractive or never beneficial. Operationalizing real option 
components such as operational changes required to change strategies and 
implement project monitoring signals improves option implementation. Through 
these means, real options can improve program planning and management by 
helping managers recognize, design, and use flexible alternatives to manage 
dynamic uncertainty.  
Javelin Technology Options 
As mentioned before, three teams were formed to develop competing 
guidance technologies for the Javelin. Only one team would then be chosen for 
follow-on advanced development and then production. Ford Aerospace was teamed 
with its partner Loral Systems, offering the laser-beam riding (LBR) missile. Hughes 
Aircraft was teamed with Boeing, offering a fiber-optic (FO) guided missile. Texas 
Instruments was teamed with Martin Marietta, offering an imaging infrared or forward 
looking infrared (FLIR) missile system. With the laser-beam riding system, the 
gunner would identify the target visually and point a laser beam at the target 
throughout flight. After launch, the missile continuously corrected its flight to match 
the line of the laser (to “ride” the laser beam) to the target. The optical fiber system 
included a coil of very long and fine optical fiber that connected the launch unit, 
operated by the gunner, to a camera in the nose of the missile. The gunner would fly 
the missile to the target using a joystick controller device. The FLIR scanned the 
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view in front of the gunner and generated a thermal-based image of the target area. 
Once observed through the Command Launch Unit, or thermal sight, the gunner 
switched to a starting array in the missile to acquire the target by narrowing brackets 
in the viewfinder around the target with a simple thumb switch. After launch, the 
missile would continuously correct its flight path using a tracking algorithm that 
employed optical correlators oriented upon visible and distinct target features.  
Each of the teams enjoyed generally successful missile flight test outcomes 
as the proof of principle phase ended after 27 months. Each flew over a dozen 
missiles and achieved a target hit rate of over 60%. Each candidate system had 
specific advantages and disadvantages:  
 The Ford/Loral Laser-Beam Rider required an exposed gunner and 
man-in-loop throughout its rapid flight. It was cheapest at an estimated 
$90,000 cost per kill, a figure that was comprised not only of average 
unit production cost estimates but also reliability and accuracy 
estimates. It was fairly effective in terms of potential combat utility, with 
diminishing probability-of-hit at increasing range. Top-attack on armor 
would be dependent upon precision fusing and detonation and 
accuracy of downward-firing explosively formed projectiles from 
shaped charges. 
 The Hughes/Boeing Fiber-Optic guide prototype enabled an 
unexposed gunner (once launched) and also required man-in-loop 
throughout its slower flight. It was judged as likely costlier but less 
affected by accuracy throughout range with its automatic lock and 
guidance in its terminal stage of flight—and it even offered target 
switching. It was also more gunner training (learning) intensive but 
could attack targets from above, where the armor is thinnest. 
 The FLIR prototype offered completely autonomous fire and forget 
flight to target after launch but was perceived as both the costliest and 
the technologically riskiest alternative. It was going to be easiest to 
train and would be effective to maximum ranges by means of its target 
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acquisition sensor and guidance packages. It used “top attack” as a 
more effective means of armored target defeat, but would also have a 
flat trajectory capability for “direct fire” against targets under cover of 
bridges, trees, and so forth.  
Effectiveness of Technology Options 
To evaluate the effectiveness of each alternative, we can use a simple 
hierarchical model based on the acquisition objectives identified for the anti-tank 
missile—lethality, tactical advantage, gunner safety, and procurement.1 Our multi-
criteria effectiveness model is based on concepts developed by decision analysts 
(see, for example, Buede, 1986; Keeney, 1982; and Keeney, 1988). The first three 
objectives deal with the operational effectiveness of the missile, while procurement 
recognizes that there are transaction costs and technology issues that make some 
alternatives easier to procure than others. Under each objective, there are metrics 
we can use to measure how well the objective is achieved. The objectives and 
corresponding metrics (measures) are shown in Table 1.   
The relative importance of objectives and the relative importance of each 
measure with respect to an objective are shown in Table 1 by the weight assigned to 
each objective and measure. In our notional example, lethality, tactical advantage 
and gunner safety are each equally important but three times as important as 
procurement, so they are each assigned a weight of 0.3 while procurement receives 
a weight of 0.1. All the weights at each level of the hierarchy add up to one. For 
lethality, the relative importance of probability of a hit and kill or P(H)*P(K) is 0.7 
compared to top-attack capability (0.3). For tactical advantage, the most important 
attribute is weight (0.4), followed by time to engage (0.3), then time of flight (0.2) and 
redirect capability (0.1). Gunner safety is measured by the amount of training 
required (0.2) and the gunner’s exposure to enemy fire after launch (0.8). 
                                            
1 The Services procuring the Javelin system did not actually use this exact methodology for the 
selection of the Javelin guidance technology but used something similar for a weighted decision 
analysis of the three alternatives. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 9 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
Table 1. Anti-Tank Missile Guidance System Effectiveness 
weight objective weight measure
value score value score value score
0.3 Lethality
0.7 P(H)*P(K) 5 1.05 4 0.84 7 1.47
0.3 Top attack 6 0.54 7 0.63 9 0.81
0.3 Tactical Advantage 1
0.4 Weight 9 1.08 5 0.6 3 0.36
0.3 Time to engage 8 0.72 7 0.63 5 0.45
0.2 Time of flight 7 0.42 5 0.3 5 0.3
0.1 Redirect capability 10 0.3 10 0.3 0 0
0.3 Gunner safety 1
0.2 Required training 5 0.3 1 0.06 10 0.6
0.8 Exposure after launch 2 0.48 8 1.92 10 2.4
1
0.1 Procurement 1 Ease of procurement 8 0.8 6 0.6 4 0.4
1 MOE 5.69 5.88 6.79
LBR FO FLIR
 
The metric values achieved by each technology are converted to a notional 
value on a scale of 0 to 10, indicating the value the Army assigned to the actual level 
of performance. For example, the weight of a missile would be measured in pounds, 
with lighter systems preferred over heavier systems. In Table 1, the LBR system is 
the lightest and receives a value of 9, followed by the FO system which receives a 
value of 5. The FLIR system is the heaviest and receives the lower value of 3. For 
gunner safety, we want to minimize the amount of time the gunner is exposed to 
enemy fire (measured in minutes). For LBR, the gunner must stay in place until the 
target is hit, leading to a longer exposure time, so the LBR receives a low value of 2. 
The FO systems allows the gunner to hide while guiding the system, so he is 
exposed for a shorter time, and thus the FO system receives a better value of 8. The 
FLIR system allows the gunner to conceal himself immediately after launch (fire and 
forget). Thus, it is given the maximum value of 10. The other values shown in Table 
1 are derived in a similar fashion. 
A notional measure of effectiveness achieved by each of the three 
alternatives is shown at the bottom of Table 1. The scores shown in Table 1 for each 
metric (measure) are calculated by multiplying the value for the measure times the 
weight for that measure times the objective weight. For example, required training 
has a weight of 0.2 and is a metric that supports gunner safety which has a weight of 
0.3. LBR received a value of 5 for this metric, so the score for LBR is 0.3 = (5) × 
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(0.2) × (0.3). The score for FO is 0.060 = (1) × (0.2) × (0.3) and the score for FLIR is 
0.6 = (10) × (0.2) × (0.3). All other scores in Table 1 are calculated in a similar 
manner. The MOE for any given alternative is the sum of the individual metric 
scores. For example, the MOE for LBR is 5.69 = 1.05 + 0.54 + 1.08 + 0.72 + 0.42 + 
0.30 + 0.30 + 0.48 + 0.80. Note that the MOE is calculated on a scale of 0 to 10 
where an “ideal” alternative would receive an MOE of 10. The notional MOEs in 
Table 1 are consistent with the Army’s preference for the three guidance 
technologies, in that the Army preferred FLIR over the other two guidance systems 
and perceived the FO system as being slightly better than the LBR system. 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
The previous section considered only the relative effectiveness of the three 
guidance alternatives. To select the best alternative, we have to also consider the 
development and procurement costs. The Army estimated the cost per kill for each 
alternative as shown in Table 2. We also show an estimate of the total program cost 
for each alternative in Table 2 assuming 2,000 missiles are procured. 
Table 2. Anti-Tank Missile Cost 
LBR FO FLIR 
Cost/kill ($M) $0.09 $0.11 $0.15 
Program Cost ($M) $180 $220 $300 
A cost versus effectiveness graph is shown in Figure 3. The total program 
cost and MOE for each alternative is shown on the graph. 
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Figure 3. Anti-Tank Missile Total Program Cost vs. Effectiveness 
From Figure 3, we can see that no alternative dominates another, meaning 
there is no alternative that is both cheaper and more effective than another. Thus, 
we must look at the marginal benefit and marginal cost to evaluate the alternatives. 
The LBR alternative is the least costly and least effective. We compare it to the FO 
alternative in Table 3 and note that the marginal cost of choosing FO over LBR is 
$40 million. Table 3 also shows the difference in values for each of the effectiveness 
measures used to calculate the MOE between the two alternatives. A positive 
change represents an increase in effectiveness, while a negative difference 
indicates a decrease in effectiveness. A similar analysis for FO versus FLIR is 
shown in Table 4. 
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Table 3. Marginal Analysis of Cost and Effectiveness for LBR and FO 
Marginal Analysis  LBR FO Difference 
Program Cost ($M) $180 $220 $ 40 
P(H)*P(K) 5 4 -1 
Top attack 6 7 +1 
Weight 9 5 -4 
Time to engage 8 7 -1 
Time of flight 7 5 -2 
Redirect capability 10 10 0 
Required training 5 1 -4 
Exposure after 
launch 2 8 +6 
Ease of 
procurement 8 6 -2 
Table 4. Marginal Analysis of Cost and Effectiveness for FO and FLIR 
Marginal Analysis  FO FLIR Difference 
Program Cost ($M) $220 $300 $ 80 
P(H)*P(K) 4 7 +3 
Top attack 7 9 +2 
Weight 5 3 -2 
Time to engage 7 5 -2 
Time of flight 5 5 0 
Recall capability 10 0 -10 
Required training 1 10 +9 
Exposure after 
launch 8 10 +2 
Ease of 
procurement 6 4 -2 
While Figure 3 gives us an overall picture of the cost versus effectiveness of 
the three alternatives, Tables 3 and 4 allow us to see what is gained and lost at the 
margin when going from one technology to the next. Arguably this is captured in the 
overall MOE, but decision-makers are often interested in seeing what specifically 
they are getting for their money. In addition, because the MOE is a combination of 
different metrics that are not necessarily interchangeable, it would not make sense 
to simply calculate the ratio of MOE to cost. Instead, the marginal analysis defines 
the trade-off space, but not the solution, for the decision-makers. 
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The previous cost versus effectiveness analysis assumed that all the 
guidance technology development efforts would be equally successful and achieve 
the calculated MOEs. But at the start of the proof of principle effort, there was no 
assurance that any of the technologies would be successfully developed. In fact, the 
probability of success differed between the three alternatives. A notional assessment 
of the probability of success for each option is given in Table 5. 
Table 5. Probability of Development Success and Expected MOE for 
Javelin Technology Options 
LBR FO FLIR 
P(success) 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Expected MOE 3.414 2.94 2.716 
Table 5 also shows the expected MOE based on the given probability of 
success for each option. The expected MOE is simply the MOE shown in Table 1 
multiplied by the probability of success. Using the expected MOE, we can develop a 
revised cost versus effectiveness graph, as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Anti-Tank Missile Total Program Cost vs. Effectiveness 
Using the expected MOE, we see that both the FO and FLIR guidance 
systems are dominated by the LBR system, since it is both cheaper and has a 
higher expected MOE. (As it turned out, the Army’s actual Cost and Operational 
Effectiveness Analysis [COEA] also found that the LBR was the preferred 
alternative.) 
Value of Technology Options 
The value of a real option is derived from the difference between the 
expected net value (benefits minus costs) of an investment and the net value of that 
investment given that it succeeds. The option value lies in the flexibility to terminate 
the project if it is not successful. To develop a simple option valuation model for the 
Javelin guidance technologies, we note that the benefits are given by the MOE as 
shown in Table 1. If we do not use a real option approach, then each of the 
alternatives has an expected cost based on the uncertainty associated with the 
technology development. If the development effort fails, we assume the Army will 
have to pay some additional cost to finish developing the technology and achieve 
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the anticipated level of effectiveness (MOE). We refer to this additional cost as the 
“cost to fix” the technology. If the technology development phase is successful, then 
the cost to exercise the option will be the total program cost from Table 2 and is 
shown as “cost to implement” in Table 6. If the technology development phase fails, 
the cost of the alternative will be the cost to implement plus the cost to fix the 
technology. The total expected cost of each alternative is given in Table 6. 
Table 6. Expected Cost of Javelin Guidance Technology Alternatives 
Without Option to Terminate Project 
LBR FO FLIR 
Probability of success 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Cost to implement 180 220 300 
    
Probability of failure 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Cost to fix 50 70 90 
Total cost to implement 
given failure 230 290 390 
Expected Cost 200 255 354 
The values shown in Table 6 assume that decision-makers do not use a real 
options approach. Instead, they pick one of the technologies based on the cost 
versus benefit analysis presented in the previous section. Whichever technology is 
chosen, there is an additional cost to achieve the anticipated effectiveness (MOE) if 
the development phase fails. 
Using a real options approach, the Army pays for the option to find out 
whether the technology development succeeds before making a final choice. If the 
development succeeds, we have achieved the MOE shown in Table 1 and can 
proceed with the project if we prefer that option (based on the cost versus 
effectiveness analysis presented in the previous section). If the development fails, 
we terminate the project and there is no further cost. The value of the option is given 
by the difference between the expected value of the project with no option (from 
Table 6) and the expected value of the project with the option to terminate. The 
calculations are shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Value of Javelin Guidance Technology Options 
LBR FO FLIR 
Probability of success 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Cost to implement 180 220 300 
Probability of failure 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Cost if project is 
terminated 0 0 0 
Expected cost with option 108 110 120 
Expected cost w/o option 200 255 354 
Value of option 92 145 234 
The values of the options for each alternative are different because there are 
different levels of uncertainty associated with each technology. Given that we are 
willing to pay for the technology with no options, the more uncertain the technology, 
the more we value the option to terminate the project if the technology development 
fails. The values shown in Table 7 are maximums in the sense that if we pay any 
more than the option value, we would have been better off not using an option. If we 
pay less than the option value, we experience real cost savings by not expending 
funds on an unsuccessful technology.   
Suppose the Army preferred the LBR technology (based on the cost versus 
effectiveness analysis presented in the previous section). They should pay no more 
than $92 million for the option to terminate the project. But the Army was buying 
options for all three technologies, so the total amount that they spend on options 
should not exceed the value of the option for the preferred technology. Since the 
value of the LBR option is $92 million, if they allocated the option value equally 
across all the alternatives, they should spend no more than about $30 million for 
each option, which is exactly what they did.   
But allocating the option value equally across the alternatives does not make 
sense, given that some technology is more uncertain that others. It would make 
more sense to allocate the option value based on the level of uncertainty that we are 
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trying to resolve. Using the probability of failure in Table 7 as a notional measure of 
risk, we can allocate the option value in proportion to that risk, giving 27% of the total 
option value to LBR, 33% to FO, and 40% to FLIR. Going back to our previous 
example, if the Army prefers the LBR technology, then the total cost of the option 
should not exceed $92 million. That means the Army should pay about $25 million 
for the LBR option, $30 million for the FO option, and $37 million for the FLIR option. 
Doing so allocates the dollars based on risk while keeping the total cost equal to the 
option value of the preferred alternative. Again, we note that $92 million is a 
maximum. To realize any cost savings from the option, the Army must pay less than 
$92 million for all three options. 
The Army’s Choice 
The laser-beam rider candidate emerged the winner of the COEA based on 
weighted cost/efficiency factors. But in a strange twist, the concurrent deliberation of 
the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) instead chose the FLIR candidate 
because of a bias toward fire and forget. As part of the capability formulation 
process, technical constraints are deliberately avoided in requirements documents, 
to allow and encourage a maximum range of alternative solutions to the need or 
capability deficiency. Although time of flight and gunner survivability were not stated 
requirements in the AAWS–M Joint Required Operational Capability document per 
se, fire and forget nevertheless translated into greatly enhanced gunner survivability 
and overwhelmingly appealed to user representatives.  
In June 1989, a full-scale development (now called Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development) contract was awarded for the AAWS–M project to the 
Joint Venture team of Texas Instruments and Martin Marietta. At the macro level, the 
office of the Secretary of Defense viewed the program as acceptable with regard to 
risk because of its 27-month technology development phase, use of real options for 
a technical solution, and subsequent 36-month plan for full-scale development. But 
at the program office level, it was known to be one of high risk in several technical 
areas. Focal plane array (FPA) technology was still immature and would be gauged 
today at approximately Technology Readiness Level 5, despite its successful 
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technology-development phase results. It was always recognized as technologically 
risky, so the government funded its own night-vision laboratory to partially fund other 
companies that could produce these devices. In 1991, the only five known FPA 
makers in the world were Rockwell International, Loral, Santa Barbara Research 
Corporation, Sofradir (a French firm), and Texas Instruments.  
The two-partner Joint Venture in the full-scale development phase was also 
free to maximize competition at the subcontractor level. In their make-versus-buy 
decision, Texas Instruments elected to make the focal plane array for both of its 
uses in the command launch unit and in the missile. The company had made these 
devices for other programs but not in these two distinct configurations (scanning and 
starting arrays).  
As an additional gauge of technological maturity, a comparative baseline test 
was mandated at the second milestone upon the decision to launch the Javelin 
program into full-scale development. That test would pit the immature focal plane 
array technology against existing Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided  
(TOW) and Dragon (legacy systems) night-viewing optics. Results of this test 
showed the Javelin's immature focal plane arrays to be substantially better in 
performance than the Dragon and almost as effective as the much larger TOW anti-
tank missile system.  
About 18 months into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
(EMD) phase, serious technical problems around focal plane array attainment of 
specified sensitivity and production yield, system weight, tracker algorithm, and other 
areas doubled the expected cost of development and added about eighteen more 
months to the originally planned thirty-six months to complete. This constituted a 
Nunn–McCurdy breach of cost and schedule thresholds, with requisite 
Congressional notifications and formal re-baselining taking the better part of the next 
year to accomplish. Over that next year, the program sought a new baseline with 
many different revised program estimates—climbing from 36 months duration and 
$298 million in cost, to 48 months duration and $372 million in cost, and finally 54 
months and $443 million for the total cost and duration of this phase. Within that 
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year, the program was restructured, given the new baseline, and finished largely 
within its new parameters. The additional eighteen months added to the 36-month 
phase helped resolve the uncertainties and complexities of system development 
without additional schedule slippage. 
Today, Javelin is viewed as being a totally successful weapon system, 
despite its much earlier programmatic shortcomings in development. It is being used 
in combat operations and has continued through many full-rate production contract 
periods. Over 1,000 Javelin missiles have been fired in the Iraq War and 
Afghanistan since March 2003, with close to 98% reliability. The system design has 
continued to be upgraded—not as blocks of capability, but with software, warhead, 
and producibility enhancements.  
Conclusions 
Several observations can be made from our analysis of the Javelin guidance 
technology acquisition process. The first is that the benefit of weapon systems, or in 
this case missile guidance systems, is not measured in dollars. This makes using a 
traditional option valuation model (based on benefits minus costs) difficult. Instead, 
we must use the principles of multi-criteria decision-making to develop an MOE for 
each alternative. The MOE can be compared to the cost to define the trade space 
for the decision-maker. 
Second, we note that the three proposed guidance technologies had different 
levels of risk. We use this information to calculate the expected MOE for each 
alternative, thus incorporating uncertainty into the analysis. The probabilistic MOE 
can be compared to the expected cost (in our case, cost per kill) to present a risk-
adjusted trade space for the decision-maker. 
Third, we show that a real options approach allows us not only to incorporate 
uncertainty in our analysis but also to calculate the value of the option based upon 
risk. This leads to different option values for different alternatives based on the 
technology maturity. Using this approach, the Army should have offered each 
development team a different amount of money to develop their proposed 
technology. Doing so would have better allocated the dollars to manage risk. 
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Finally, we note that the final cost to fix the FLIR guidance technology 
selected by the Army turned out to be significantly higher than the $30 million 
originally paid to develop the technology. This is in line with what our real options 
model suggested, since the FLIR technology was always anticipated to be the 
riskiest.  
The use of real options models allows us to estimate the value of flexibility in 
acquisition decisions. Understanding this value allows program managers to assign 
program dollars based on risk and supports the efficient use of limited program 
resources. 
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